Skip to main content

灾后机会 经济学人 after the crisis opportunity

that is to everybody, like the war in the history. bE BOLD  TO CHANGE! Life and country leader. same.

Part 1

some years loom large赫然涌现 in history. usually it is the end of a war or the onset of a revolution革命来领 that punctuates强调 the shift from one chapter to another. 2020 will be an exception. the defeat of donald trump marked the end of ons the most divisive and damaging presidencies in American history. A one-in-a-century pandemic has created the opportunity for an economic and social reset as dramtic as that of the pregressive era. the big question for 2021 is whehter politicians are bold enough to grasp it.

part 2

covid19 has not just pummelled重击 the global economy. it has changed the trajectory轨迹曲线 of the 3 big forces that are shaping the modern world. the digital revolution has been radically accelerated. and the geopolotical rivalry竞赛 between america and china has intensified变本加厉. at the same time, the pandemic has worsened恶化/更坏 one of today’s great scourges瘟疫灾难: inequality. and by showing the toll代价钟声 of being unprepared for a low-probability, high-impact disaster, it has focused more minds on the coming century’s inevitable and even higher-impact disaster,  that of climate change. all this means there is no going back to the pre-covid world.

part 3

that will not be obvious at the start of the year. amidst the misery痛苦悲惨不行 of a resurgent复活的 second wave, attention in many counties will still be focused on controlling the virus. as the new year begins a vaccine will be on the horizon即将来临, though not yet widely available. only as the 2021 progresses, and vaccines are rolled out铺开展开, will it become clear how much has permaneently changed.

part 4

and that will turn out to be a lot, particularly in the west. the post covid world will be far more digital, the pandemic has compressed years’ worth of transformation into months, bringing with it a dramatic shake-up人事改组剧变 in how people live, what they buy and where they work. winners from this bout回合 of creative destruction include the tech giants and large companies more broadly. big cities will have to reinvent themselves. expect a flood of closures倒闭, expecially among small biz and in the retail, travel and hospitality industies.

 

part 5

although globalistation will still be about goods and capital crossing borders, people will travel less. that asian countries that controlled the virus most effectively were also those that shut their borders most strictly. their experience will shape other’ polices. border restrictions and quarantines will stay in place long after covid 19 caseloads病例数 fall. and even after tourism restarts, migration will remain much harder. that will dent削弱减少 the propects of poor countires that reply on flows of remittances汇款 from their migrant workers abroad, reinforcing the damage done by the pandemic itself. some 150m people are likely to fall into extreme poverty by the end of 2021.

Part 6

global commerce will be conducted against an inauspoicious geopolitical backdrop. mr trump’s mercurial mercantilism will be gone, but america’s suspicion of china will not end with the departure of tariff man, as the president was pround to be known. tariffs, now levied on two-thirds of imports from china, will remain, as will restrictions on its technology compaies. the splintering of the digital world and its supply chain into two parts, one chinese-dominated and the other american-led, will continue. sino-american ravalry will not be the only fissiparous influence on gloabalisation. Chastend by their reliance on imported medical supplies and other critical goods, governments from EU to india will redefine the scope of strategic industries that must be protected. state aid to support this new industrial policy has become and will remain ubiquitous.

  • inauspicious 不吉利的,不详的
  • backdrop 背景
  • mercurial 善变
  • mercantilism 商业主义
  • levied 征收
  • splintering 分裂成碎片
  • fissiparous 分离倾向的
  • ubiquitous 无处不在

Part 7

all this will leave the world economy divided and diminished. the gap between strength in china and weakness elsewhere will remain glaring. china’s was the only big economy to grow in 2020. in 2021 its growth rate will exceed 7% substantially faster than the pace of recovery in EU and america.  amd unlike western ecnomies, its recovery will not be underpinned by gaping budget deficits or extraordinary monetary stimulus. china’s economic success and quick vanquishing of covid 19 will be the backdrop for a year of triumphal celebration in beijing, as the CCP marks its centenary.

  • leave the world dimished 减偌
  • underpinned 加强xx 基础 支持,巩固
  • monetary stimulus 货币刺激
  • vanquishing  defet 打败 战胜
  • triumphal  adj. 凯旋的,胜利的
  • marks its centenary 庆贺 一百周年;一百周年纪念(或庆典

Part 8

the contrast with the west will be stark. america will start the year with wobbly growth, not least beccuse of the failure to pass a sufficient stimulus package in the last days of the trump administration.  eu’s economies will be sluggish far longer, with generous furlough schemes tying people to jobs that no longer exist and zombie firms propped up by the state. on both sides of atlantic, the inequity of the impact of covid19 will becom ever clearer: the most vulneable hit hardest by the virus; job lossed concentrated amonf the less skilled; educational disruption harming poorer kids’ prospects the most. public anger will grow, particularly in america, whih will enter 2021 still a deeply divided country.

  • stark 明显的,完全的
  • wobbly 不稳定的;摆动的;歪斜的
  • slugggish 萧条的;迟钝的;行动迟缓的;懒惰的
  • furlough  休假;暂时解雇;放假
  • tying   系;(用带子)系紧;把……打结;打(结、蝴蝶结);束缚;连接;(使)有关联;在……之间置系梁;用连接符连接(音符);连音演奏;打成平局(tie 的现在分词)
  • zombie firms
  • propped up  v. 支撑;支持
  • disruption n. 扰乱,打乱,中断

 

Part 9

with the west battered 连续猛击;磨损 and china crowing啼叫, planty of pundits权威 will declare the pandemic to be the death knell 丧钟 接触信号  for a western-led world order. that will prove premature 比预期的早. for all its vaccine diplomacy china inspire fear and suspicion more than admiration 赞赏. and for all his determination to bring china centre-stage, its president, xi jinping, shows little appetite 欲望胃口for genuine global leadership. although Mr trump’s contempt轻蔑 for allies同盟国 and forays袭击 突击 into transactional事务处理 diplomacy have shaken  trust in the American-led global order, they have not destroyed it.

 

Part 10

That means America, once again, will have disproportionate不成比例 ability to shape the post-pandemic world- and the man most able to set the tone is a 78yo, whose political career began closer to the presidency of Calvin coolidge 卡尔文柯立芝 than today. joe biden, a consensus-building共识建立 moderate whose own political posittions have always tacked close to his party’s centre of gravity , is an improbable architect of a bold new era 大胆创新的时代.

Part 11

but he could be just the right person, mr biden’s policy platform is ambitious enough. behind the slogan of build back better is a bold but not radical激进的根本的 , attempt to marry short-term stimulus with hefty异常的强大的 investment in green infrastructure, research and technology to dramatically accelerate America’s energy transformation. from expanding healthy-care access to improving social insurance, the social contract proposed by bidenomic is a 21st-century version of the progressive era: bold reform without dangerous leftism急进主义.

Part 12

in foreign policy mr biden will repair relation and reaffirm重申 america’s values and global role. A verteran of diplomacy and instinctive本能的直觉的 mulltilaterlist多边主义者 and institution-builder制度建立者, mr biden will send strong signals quickly: america will re-enter the paris climate agreement, stay in the WHO and join COVAX, the global coalition联合会 to distribute a covid-19 vaccine. He will head quickly to Europe to reaffirm America’s commitment to NATO and the transatlantic大西洋两岸国家的;横渡大西洋的;在大西洋彼岸的 alliance -though his first stop will be berin or Paris, rather than Boris Johnson’s Brexit Britain. Mr Biden will reassert重新主张 the importance of human rights and democracy to Americam foreign policy. Expect tough criticism of China for its treatment of Uyghurs in xinjiang and its oppression in HK, there will be no more palling伙伴 with dictators 独裁者.

part 13

on the most important issues, however, mr biden’s presidency will offer more a change of apporoach than of direction. America will remain concerned  about the threat posed by a rising china. the trump administration deserves credit值得称赞 for focuing attention on it. but rather than attack with unilateral单方向 tariffs, Mr biden’s team will focus on building a mutilateral coalition to counter china, expect talk of a transaltlantic grand bargain, where america assuages减轻/缓和 european concerns about its tech giants, particularly the personal data they gather and the tax they dont pay. in return for a joint approach towards chinese tech companies. expect talk of a new global alliance, binding捆绑 asian democracies into the western coalition to counter china, the basis, conceivably可以想象得到, of a new kind of american-led world order.

part 14

the opportunity is there. the question is whether mr biden will grasp it. the risk is that, both at home and abroad, a binden presidency proves to be long on soothing安慰 words and short on effective action; that , whether or not he is constrained强迫 by a Republican senate, mr biden himself is too focused on repairing yesterday’s world rather than building tomorrow’s, and too keen to protect existing jobs and prop up支持支撑 ossified僵化的;已骨化的 multilateral institutions to push for the kind of change that is needed. the biggest danger is not the leftist lurch that many republican fear – it is of inaction不作为, timidity胆小 and stasis停滞. For america and the world , that would be a terible shame.

 

 

Leave a Reply

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.

%d bloggers like this: